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1. Introduction  
In order to catch up with the current technological frontier, firms in developing countries have been striving 
to promote technological advance through internal research and development efforts (in-house R&D), as 
well as through external technology purchasing (TP). In-house R&D expenditure includes the capital, 
labour, and design costs associated with research and development. TP involves purchasing, transferring, or 
licensing new technologies from the domestic or the international market. For firms in developing countries, 
establishing efficient innovation strategies could accelerate their technological advance and contribute to 
their economic development.  
In China, the central government has established a series of policy incentives to encourage firms to carry out 
in-house R&D activities,1 and these policies have greatly increased China’s capability to develop its own 
technology, and to assimilate and improve the technology transferred from advanced economies (Lu and 
Lazonick, 2001). With great emphasis placed on ‘indigenous innovation’,2 do Chinese firms still need 
external technology sourcing? Is there a synergetic benefit from engaging in both internal R&D and 
technology purchasing? The goal of this research is to answer these questions by testing whether there is a 
relationship of complementarity between the two sources of knowledge acquisition. In other words, do 
R&D and technology purchases reinforce each other in achieving higher innovation output and/or higher 
levels of productivity? 
The data on which the empirical analysis is based come from the World Bank Investment Climate Survey 
(ICS)3 relating to China in the year 2003. This dataset provides continuous data on R&D and technology 
purchases. The results exhibit some evidence of complementarity between in-house R&D and TP in raising 
the sales of new products per employee in small-sized Chinese manufacturing firms with 100 to 300 
employees. In-house R&D seems to accelerate the assimilation of external expertise, while external 
technology sourcing enhances the efficiency of in-house innovation activities. However, we find that R&D 
and TP are substitutes when it comes to raising labour productivity. Only for firms with fewer than 100 
employees is there a complementarity visible in terms of labour productivity. 
The next section sets the background by reviewing the existing evidence on complementarity between 
internal and external technology acquisition in developing countries, and by describing the evolution of the 
policy of technology acquisition in China. Section 3 defines the notion of complementarity and the 
																																																								1	Especially after 1995, policies were designed to accelerate indigenous science and technology development. The number of patent 
applications from domestic applicants was 10,011 in 1995, and it has increased dramatically ever since. The number reached 39,806 
by 2002 and 255,832 by 2011 (China Patent Office, 2012). http://www.english.sipo.gov.cn/.	2	Indigenous innovation means ‘to develop the capability to conduct R&D or create innovation internally’.	3	For more information on the Investment Climate Survey, see http://www.worldbank.org.	
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specification of the model used in the empirical analysis. The data and the variables used will be presented in 
section 4. The results are interpreted in section 5. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.  
 
2. Background 
2.1 In-house R&D and technology purchasing: complements or substitutes? 
A large number of empirical studies have estimated the relationship between innovation-sourcing strategies 
in developing countries. Results are mixed. One group of studies concludes that internal R&D and external 
technology are substitutes for each other. Firms decide to develop technology by themselves and/or buy it 
from outside, given a limited budget. An increase in either of the two options, therefore, tends to reduce the 
spending incurred on the other one. Mytelka (1987) found that external imports of technology discouraged 
Andean-group countries from undertaking in-house innovation activities. Fikkert (1993) regressed 
technology imports on in-house R&D efforts and also found a negative relationship between technology 
imports and R&D efforts in Indian manufacturing firms. Basant and Fikkert (1996) estimated the returns on 
R&D, technology imports, and their interaction, using Indian firm-level panel data. They found 
substitutability between R&D effort and external technology in the production of knowledge. Katrak (1997) 
found that the probability of importing technology is only weakly influenced by R&D efforts, and Blonigen 
and Taylor (2000) also conclude that firms either make or buy technology.  
Another group of studies concludes that in-house R&D and external technology purchasing are 
complementary strategies. According to the notion of absorptive capacity proposed by Cohen and Levinthal 
(1989), the successful use of external technology requires the ability to assimilate external technology and 
apply it internally. As suggested by Fu, Pietrobelli, and Soete (2010), a crucial condition for the effective 
transfer of technology to developing countries is their level of absorptive capacity. In this sense, parallel 
indigenous innovation efforts are complementary to international technology diffusion. The studies by 
Desai (1989), Lall (1989), and Mowery and Oxley (1995) confirm the view that technological capability is 
needed in order to understand the tacit components of foreign technology. Besides, acquiring technology 
externally helps to improve the efficiency of doing in-house R&D. As Aggarwal (2000) points out, external 
technology sourcing plays two important roles in developing economies: filling gaps in domestic 
technological capability and upgrading the existing technologies to international standards. By enhancing 
technological capability, it may consequently stimulate in-house R&D. Braga and Willmore (1991) found 
that there is a robust complementary relationship between technology buying and firms’ technology efforts 
in Brazilian industry. Deolalikar and Evenson (1989) and Kim and Nelson (2000) come to the same 
conclusion on the basis of Indian data. A number of studies have tested a slightly different but related 
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hypothesis based on data from developed countries, namely the existence of complementarity between 
internal and external R&D: Arora and Gambardella (1990) for large US, European, and Japanese 
biotechnology firms, Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) and Veugelers (1997) for Belgian manufacturing firms, 
Bönte (2003) for West German industry data, and Belderbos et al. (2008) for Dutch firm data. Most of the 
studies share the view that internal and external R&D are complementary, although Audretsch, Menkveld, 
and Thurik (1996) find that the complementarity applies only to high-technology industries.  
2.2 Country background 
China has been the fastest-growing major economy in the past 30 years, with an average annual GDP 
growth rate greater than 10 per cent. Around 8 per cent of the total manufacturing output in the world 
comes from China, and it ranks third worldwide in industrial output.4 The extraordinary performance of the 
Chinese economy makes it very interesting to study its technology-acquisition behaviour and to examine 
whether such acquisition contributed to the growth performance of its manufacturing firms.  
In the 1950s, China began to acquire technology externally. At first, the major source of technology was the 
former Soviet Union. Then, western countries and Japan became the main suppliers of technology to heavy 
industry. After the economic open-door policy was launched in 1976, importing external technology 
constituted an essential component of the Four Modernisation Programmes (Zhao, 1995). Technology 
transfer became diversified through the purchase of turnkey plants and equipment, through foreign direct 
investment (FDI), and in the form of disembodied technology, including licensing, technical consulting, 
technical service, and co-production. Another feature is that the source of technology widened. Five 
countries – the USA, Japan, Germany, France, and the UK – dominated the supply of technology to China 
at that time. After the economic reforms of 1978, other industrial countries and regions, such as Canada, 
Italy, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, played an increasing role in providing technology to China (Zhang, 1990; 
Liu, 1992; Zhao, 1995). In 1985, the central government initiated the science and technology system reform, 
which defined the acquisition of foreign technology as one of the main technology-sourcing strategies for 
promoting technological development. After 1995, policies were designed to accelerate indigenous science 
and technology development by creating incentives and providing support for firms to establish R&D 
departments. As a result, these units increased dramatically, from 7,000 in 1987 to over 24,000 by 1998 
(China Science and Technology Statistics, 1992, 1998),5 and the R&D expenditure grew annually by more 
than 20 per cent from 1995 to 2003 (OECD, 2006). However, when set against China’s rapid economic 
																																																								4	For more detailed information the reader is referred to 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China	5	Source: Ministry of Science and Technology of the People’s Republic of China:	http://www.most.gov.cn/eng/	
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growth, its ratio of R&D to GDP is still remarkably low (1.13 per cent in 2003) compared with the OECD 
countries (2.25 per cent in 2003).6   
The reform of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) was a critical part of establishing the indigenous 
innovation system. Unlike the private sector, with no government financial support since the reforms began 
in the 1980s, the SOEs have remained a persistent drain on government resources (Steinfeld, 1998; White, 
2000). In order to encourage SOEs to introduce new products, rather than simply producing more of their 
existing products, the government introduced investment tax incentives (Rawski, 1994; White, 2000). 
Particularly since 1993, the innovation policy was sharply focused on reforming SOEs. Evidence has shown 
that SOEs became more strategic and dynamic in innovation in reacting to competitive pressures (Luo et al., 
1998). Managers of SOEs were being granted greater responsibility and decision-making power (Child, 1994; 
Guthrie, 1997; Walder, 1989), especially for meeting profit-based and efficiency-based measures of 
performance (Groves et al., 1994; White and Liu, 1998).  
Like other developing countries, China has two main objectives in acquiring foreign technology: to enhance 
technological capability and to facilitate economic growth by increasing productivity. It is interesting to 
examine these issues after China’s transition to a market economy, a period during which it experienced 
unprecedented changes in its social, legal, and economic institutions (Zhou, Yim, and Tse, 2005). Table 1 
presents some selected studies which analyse the relationship of internal and external technological sourcing 
in China. Although the external technology alone does not always have a significant impact on innovation, 
in general the findings confirmed the complementary relationship between in-house R&D and external 
technology sourcing (e.g. Liu and Buck, 2007; Liu and Zou, 2008; Bin, 2008; Li, 2011; Li and Wu, 2010).  
Insert table 1 here 
3.  Empirical model and testing of complementarity/substitutability 
3.1 Definitions 
A pair of economic activities is complementary if (1) adopting one does not preclude adopting the other 
one, and (2) the sum of the benefits of implementing each activity separately is not greater[SHOULDN'T 
THIS BE LESS THAN TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE? Answer: we 
meant that the benefits of implementing both activities simultaneously are greater than the sum of 
implementing each activity SEPARATELY. The following sentence states that the return of implementing 
one activity is higher if the other activity is already implemented (implementing both activities 
simultaneously)] than the benefit of implementing both together. An equivalent understanding of the second 																																																								6	Main source: OECD library, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-factbook-2005_factbook-2005-en	
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condition is that the incremental return to implementing any one of the activities is greater if the other one 
is already implemented. A theorem states that if each pair of activities in a group is complementary, then 
implementing any subset of the activities in the group raises the incremental return to implementing the 
remaining ones (Topkis, 1978). Complementarity between activities in economic models was developed by 
Vives (1990) and Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 1995). 
More formally, suppose there are two technology-acquisition practices, R&D and TP, and Z is a vector of 
exogenous variables. If R&D and TP are discrete variables, they are complementary if the presence of one 
strategy (say, R&D) increases the marginal return of adopting the other strategy (TP), controlling for other 
effects. In other words, the objective function f (R&D, TP, Z) is supermodular, meaning that the following 
inequality holds for all values of the other arguments of f(.) (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990): 
f (1, 1; Z) - f (1, 0; Z) > f(0, 1; Z) - f (0, 0; Z)                                                                                  (1)                                    
If R&D and TP are continuous variables, this inequality restriction implies that the incremental effect on the 







∂   ; where R stands for R&D and T for TP.                                                               (2)   
Conversely, R&D and TP are substitutes if the inverse of inequality (1) or (2) holds.  
Testing complementarity among activities in maximizing an objective function has been done in several 
empirical studies (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Mohnen and Röller, 2003; Belderbos et al., 2008). This 
approach is known as the production function approach (PROD). It refers to a synergistic effect between 
activities which will lead to a better performance in terms of a stated goal. Another approach to test 
complementarity, known as the correlation approach (CORR), consists in checking the sign of the 
correlation coefficient between strategies conditional on certain other determinants. In Table 1, methods 
adopted in testing complementarity are shown in column 5. The current study will focus only on the PROD. 
We shall consider two kinds of performance objective: innovation output and total factor productivity 
(TFP). If there is complementarity between in-house R&D and technology purchase, it can show up in 
greater innovation output and indirectly in higher TFP levels through the effect of innovation output on 
TFP. Given the way in which innovation output and TFP are measured, we have to resort to different 
econometric models to test complementarity with respect to each of these two objectives. 
3.2 Testing for complementarity in terms of innovation output 
Innovation output can refer to different kinds of innovation and can be measured in a qualitative or in a 
quantitative way. We shall consider two kinds of innovation output: new products and new processes. Based 
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on the questionnaire, process innovation can be measured only by its incidence, whereas product innovation 
will be measured by its incidence and its intensity. Hence for process innovation we specify a probit model, 
i.e. we observe a dichotomous variable iocPr  which equals 1 when the firm claims to have introduced a 
new process in the period under review, and zero otherwise. The values one and zero correspond 
respectively to a positive and a negative value of a latent variable *Pr ioc , which is itself determined by 
innovation inputs and firm-specific variables:  
iimimibibibmmimmbibibmimbibi WrIrIrIrIIIoc ηϕδδδνν ++++++=
** lnlnlnlnPr                      (3.1) 
where ibr ,  and imr ,  are the levels of innovation inputs (TP and R&D respectively), expressed in expenditure 
per employee, so that a marginal effect of an increase in their levels depends on the size of the firm.7 It is 
unreasonable to assume that the marginal effect of 1,000 additional RMB spent on R&D or TP would be 
the same for large and small firms. *iW is a vector of exogenous variables that affect the probability of 
innovating. bmmbmb δδδνν ,,,, , and φ are coefficients to be estimated. 
€ 
η is a random error term due to 
measurement errors and omitted variables. Since R&D and TP have many zeros (around 60 per cent for 
R&D and 80 per cent for TP), we model them first as dichotomous variables (Ibi =1 if TP is different from 
zero, and Imi =1 if R&D is different from zero, and zero otherwise) and, if they are both present, we allow 
for complementarity or substitutability between them in their continuous variations. If 
€ 
δbm  is positive 
(negative) and statistically significant, then there is complementarity (substitutability) between R&D and TP. 
Since there are only six cases8 where firms purchase technology without doing their own R&D, we cannot 
reasonably identify any complementarity or substitutability with the discrete variables.  
For product innovation, we observe, on the one hand, a dichotomous variable iodPr equal to one if a new 
product has been introduced on the market and zero otherwise; and, on the other hand, a continuous 
variable Innosalei , which measures the sales of new products per employee. Since this variable is measured 
only for firms that have introduced a new product on the market, OLS estimates would suffer from a 
potential selection bias. To correct for this bias, we shall specify a tobit type II model composed of a main 














bi WrIrIrIrIIIInnosale ηϕδδδνν ++++++= lnlnlnln)ln( ,       (3.2)                    
																																																								
7 Index b refers to ‘buy’, i.e. technology purchases; index m refers to ‘make’, i.e. own R&D.	8	Among these six cases, two are in the electronic equipment industry, two in the electronic parts-making industry, one in the 





















              (3.3)  
where *Pr iod  in the selection equation (3.3) is a latent variable which indicates if a firm had any product 
innovation or not in the period under review, depending on whether its value lies above the threshold zero 
or not. Innosalei  is only observed if 1Pr =iod . We assume that the error terms ηi
o  and *iη  follow a joint 
normal distribution with 1)var( * =iη ,
2
2
0 )var( ση =i , 2
*0 ),cov( ρσηη =ii . In order to identify the effects of 
the explanatory variables iW and 
*
iW , the latter will contain at least one extra exogenous variable not 
included in iW . Due to the fact that the innovation-output indicator is only available for the year 2002, the 
probit model (3.1) and the generalized tobit model (3.2) and (3.3) will be estimated on cross-sectional data.  
3.3 Testing for complementarity in terms of total factor productivity 
In addition to looking at the effect of technology-sourcing strategies on innovation output, we will go one 
step further and also investigate whether there is a synergy between R&D and TP in promoting firms’ 
productivity performance. We start from a general production function: 
itititititit MLKhTFPgY ε+= ),,()(                                                 (4)  
where Yit stands for total sales, Kit , Lit , and Mit represent respectively the inputs physical capital, labour, and 
materials, TFPit is the total factor productivity, which is driven by the innovation inputs, industry specifics, 
and ownership characteristics, and εit is a random error term.  Here we index all variables by subscripts i for 
firms and t for time, because now we have panel data. TFP is supposed to be a function of the innovation 
inputs itbr , (TP per employee) and itmr ,  (R&D expenditure per employee), other explanatory variables Vit 
(ownership dummies, export dummies, and age of the firm), industry dummies (Ii) to capture differences in 
technological opportunities, and time dummies (Tt) to capture year-to-year fluctuations in productivity. We 
assume that the functions g(.) and h(.) are separable, and that both are second-order approximations after a 
logarithmic transformation of (4).  
After rewriting (4) in terms of labour productivity, so as to estimate directly the extent of scale economies, 
























   (5)  
As in equations (3), we model the effects of R&D and TP first as a step function with different levels of 
TFP for the observations where R&D or TP is present, and secondly in a continuous way only for the cases 
where both are present. In (5) we have expressed R&D and TP in logarithms assuming constant elasticities. 
The disturbance term has two orthogonal components: the time-invariant individual effects iω , which are 
unobserved by the econometrician but known to the firm (such as managerial ability or organizational 
ability), and the idiosyncratic productivity shocks itε , which are unobserved by the econometrician and by 
the firm. We assume the idiosyncratic error term to be uncorrelated with past values of the explanatory 
variables.  
The problem here is that the inputs, especially the traditional inputs – labour, capital, and materials – but 
also the innovation-related inputs itbr ,  and itmr , , may be correlated with ωi. The endogeneity of input 
practices makes OLS fail to generate consistent estimators. To tackle the endogeneity problem we use the 
system-GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998).9 Taking the first differences 
of equation (5) will remove the unobserved individual effect ωi, thus eliminating a potential source of 
omitted variable bias in the estimation. Then, the differenced variables that are not strictly exogenous are 
instrumented with all their available lagged levels (Difference GMM). However, lagged levels are poor 
instruments for first differences if the variables are close to a random walk (Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen, 
1988; Arellano and Bover, 1995). Therefore, Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest adding another set of 
orthogonality conditions, namely between the levels of the error term and the first-differences in the 
exogenous variables under the assumption of stationarity. This is the idea behind System GMM.   
 
4. Data and variables 
The data used in our empirical analysis are from the World Bank Investment Climate Survey (ICS)10 – China 
2003. The survey is conducted in 24 industrial cities and provides us with a wide range of information about 
the economic environment and activities of the firms. The majority of firms included in the ICS China 2003 
																																																								9	We prefer to use the dynamic panel GMM approach rather than the proxy-based approach introduced by Olley and Pakes (1996). 
Ackerberg et al. (2006) compare the two approaches and discuss their respective advantages and disadvantages.	10	See footnote 3.	
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are of small or medium size.11 After removing missing values, cleaning for outliers and removing the large-
size firms, we are left with 3,332 observations of small and medium-sized firms from 18 cities and 10 
manufacturing industries for the period 2000 to 2002.12 Several aspects of firms’ innovation activity are 
covered in the survey, such as the firms’ innovative input strategies and innovation outputs. We deflate 
annual sales, profits, capital, materials, and innovation expenditure to convert them into values expressed in 
year-2000 prices.13 
4.1 Variables in the innovation equation 
The dependent variable in the innovation equation (3.1) is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the firm 
claims to have had either a product or a process innovation in the years 2000 to 2002. In equation (3.2) the 
dependent variable is the log of sales of new products per employee. There are two categories of variable 
that might affect the probability of having a successful innovation and the intensity of innovative sales.  
The first category captures firm specifics. With more profits in previous periods, firms have more cash 
available and are therefore more likely to invest in innovation and be successful innovators (Katrak, 1997). 
PROFIT per employee is the average ratio of profit (before tax) per employee from 2000 to 2002. 
CAPITAL per employee, which is the average capital/labour ratio from 2000 to 2002, serves as an indicator 
of the capital intensity, but it also to some extent reflects the size of a firm. Larger firms are expected to have 
more resources to allocate to innovation activities, which leads to better innovation performance. Company 
ownership can be a crucial variable in innovation performance in the case of China, as it affects the 
motivation to innovate and the continuity of business strategy. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are usually 
reluctant to undertake changes. However, with investment and tax incentives from the government, they 
might have more resources to carry out innovation activities. So the effect of SOEs on innovation output is 
ambiguous. Foreign-controlled firms tend to concentrate their research and development in their home 
countries (OECD, 2003). A negative sign is expected. SOE and FOREIGN indicate respectively state and 																																																								11	According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, small-sized firms have fewer than 300 employees, medium-sized firms 
have between 300 and 2,000 employees, and large-sized firms have more than 2,000 employees. The classification is based on the 
number of long-term employees according to ‘The classification of small, medium and large Chinese manufacturing firms’ from the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China: http://www.stats.gov.cn/. The large-sized firms included in the sample, after dropping 
missing values, represent about 3.5 per cent of the total sample (33 firms). We decided to drop these firms and look only at the small 
and medium-sized firms. Meanwhile, there are about 40 per cent of firms with fewer than 100 employees. It is interesting to look at 
their technology-sourcing behaviour separately, since the t-tests in Table 2 and Table 4 show that their characteristics are significantly 
differently from those of other firms.  In total, our sample is divided into three categories: firms with fewer than 100 employees (40.1 
per cent), firms with a number of employees between 100 and 300 (30.37 per cent), and firms with more than 300 employees (29.53 
per cent).	12	Firms with no information on financial outcomes are omitted. The service sector is not included, because the innovation outputs 
are not reported. Furthermore, following Hall and Mairesse (1995), we keep observations only for cases in which the capital–labour 
ratio is within three times the inter-quartile range (the difference between the 75 per cent value and the 25 per cent value) above or 
below the median. This removed 129 observations, or 2.1 per cent of the sample. The remaining sample is an unbalanced panel with 
3,332 observations for the period 2000 to 2002.	13	For the annual sales and profits, we use the wholesale-price deflators at the industry level. For capital, material, and innovation 
expenditure, the industry-input deflators are used (Chinese Bureau of Statistics, 2000–2003).	
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foreign ownership. The dummy EXPORT indicates if firms have positive exports in 2002. On the one hand, 
the point of learning-by-exporting suggests that technology flows from international buyers help to improve 
the performance of exporters (Salmon and Shaver, 2005; Liu and Zou, 2008). Furthermore, fierce 
competition on the international market stimulates firms to be innovative. On the other hand, especially in 
the case of China, exporting firms compete successfully in the international market by relying on the price 
advantage of already-existing products due to the relatively low material and labour costs. This might inhibit 
innovation, especially product innovation. So the sign of EXPORT is ambiguous. AGE is calculated as the 
number of years evolved since the enterprise started production, up to 2002. Young firms are expected to be 
more dynamic and innovative, all other things equal (Katrak, 1997), and therefore a negative effect is 
expected. Innovation activities tend to be relatively more intensive in the technologically more advanced 
industries, such as pharmaceuticals, electrical equipment, and electronics. Industry specifics are controlled 
for by industry dummies. 
The second category of explanatory variables is the set of innovation inputs. The survey contains 
information on two technology-sourcing strategies. Firms are asked to report their annual in-house R&D 
expenditure. In-house R&D spending comprises capital, labour, and design costs associated with research 
and development. The other way for firms to increase their technological expertise is to buy technology 
directly from external channels, on the domestic or the international market. Technology purchasing is 
defined in the questionnaire as the amount that firms spend on purchasing technology externally. The two 
variables are respectively denoted by R&D and TP. Both are measured in average spending per employee in 
2000–2002. More investment in in-house R&D and external technology purchasing will strengthen the 
firms’ technological capability and contribute to raising their innovation output. We expect both marginal 
effects to have a positive sign. The sign of the interaction term of R&D and TP indicates their 
complementarity or substitutability. Dummy variables R&D_PRI, R&D_UNI, and R&D_FIRM are equal to 
1 if firms have any R&D co-operation with public research institutes, universities, or other firms. The 
Chinese government has strongly encouraged Public Research Institutes (PRIs) and universities to create 
more effective links with industry since the 1980s. In 2004, about one-third of large and medium-sized 
companies’ R&D spending went to universities and PRIs as contracted R&D (National Bureau of Statistics 
of China, 2006). We use these three variables as proxies for technological opportunity. Any form of co-
operation constitutes an information source for new technologies and could lead to innovativeness. The 
benefits drawn from co-operative activities might only show up in the probability of innovation but not in 
new product sales, since most of the innovations carried out in universities and research institutes focus on 
basic science research that will not be immediately commercialized in the market.  
Additional variables are included in the selection equation (3.3) in order to avoid identification problems. 
These variables are expected to influence the occurrence of product innovation, but not the intensity. In 
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reality, such variables are difficult to define (Puhani, 2000; Vella, 1998). City dummies will be used here as 
proxies for the location of a firm. In China, being located in a developed industrial city (such as in the 
coastal area) may provide firms with greater policy-oriented opportunities to undertake innovation activities. 
However, location may not affect the intensity of innovation, which depends rather on variables reflecting 
the market structure (as shown by Sasidharan and Kathuria, 2011).  
4.2 Variables in the production function 
In the production function, the dependent variable is PRODUCTIVITY. It is measured in sales per 
employee. The three conventional inputs are CAPITAL, measured as the total book value of fixed assets, 
LABOUR, measured as the number of full-time employees, and MATERIAL, measured as the costs of raw 
materials and energy and other related costs reported by the firm.14 The innovation inputs R&D and TP and 
their interaction will also enter the productivity equation as endogenous variables. We control for several 
variables (FOREIGN, SOE, and EXPORT) that capture the firms’ competitiveness and technological 
capability. Foreign-owned firms are characterized by higher capital intensity, high quality of human capital, 
and efficient management. Many previous studies suggest that foreign-owned firms are more productive 
(Globerman et al., 1994; Doms and Jensen, 1998; Kimura and Kiyota, 2007). State-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) are usually characterized by redundant workers and inefficient management. As we can see from 
Table 2, SOEs are mostly medium-sized firms (hence above the sample average with respect to the number 
of employees), while their productivity is below the sample average. They are not motivated to perform 
efficiently, because the local government takes full responsibility for their production and profit. For this 
reason, we expect SOEs to have a negative effect on the productivity performance. EXPORT activities are 
expected to enhance economic growth and improve the productivity of involved firms (Beckerman, 1962; 
Bhagwati, 1988). Firms participating in international markets are exposed to more intense competition. More 
vigorous competition exerts discipline on firms. It therefore tends to strengthen their efficiency, and we 
expect a positive effect. We also control for industry and year specifics by using industry and year dummies.  
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Tables 2 to 4 provide descriptive statistics on the conventional inputs, the productivity performance, the 
technology sourcing, and the control variables across industries. As Table 2 shows, high-tech industries such 
as electronic equipment, household electronics, and biotechnology have a higher capital/labour ratio, are 
more productive, and more active in collaborative research. Enterprises in household electronics and 
garments are more likely to sell their products abroad and to be foreign-owned. Firms with fewer than 100 
employees are on average younger, less collaborative in research, less capital-intensive, less often foreign- or 																																																								14	The capital and material inputs are logarithmically transformed and expressed in 1,000 RMB per employee. 		
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state-owned, less export-oriented, and less productive. Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics across 
industries for SOEs. Except for the transportation-equipment industry, SOEs have lower labour–
productivity level than the other firms in the corresponding industry, confirming the OECD (2007) report. 
In contrast, SOEs are more capital-intensive and bigger (in terms of number of employees). They are more 
numerous in electronic parts, auto parts, metallurgical products, and the garment industry. They are less 
likely to export, and their average age is 28 years, which is almost twice the average age of the whole sample. 
They are more likely to collaborate in research. Notice that almost half of the SOEs in the biotechnological 
industry claim to have R&D co-operation with public research institutions.  
Insert tables 2 and 3 here 
Table 4 presents the innovation outputs and inputs of Chinese small and medium-sized manufacturing firms. 
Approximately 46 per cent of the firms claim to have introduced a new product, and 25 per cent have 
introduced a new process in the period under review. Technology-intensive industries such as electronics 
and biotech are more likely to be innovators, and they also perform better in terms of new product sales, as 
shown by column four in Table 4. It should be noted that the product and process innovations in 
developing countries are not conventionally defined as new to the market, but rather as new to the firm. It 
has been postulated that new and dynamic industries in developing countries can most readily catch up 
(Gerschenkron, 1962). Under the R&D, TP, R&D, and TP headings we report the observed incidences15 
and corresponding expenditure statistics. As is shown in Table 4, the electronic equipment, auto and auto 
parts, and biotech industries spend more on technology acquisition, both internally and externally, than 
traditional industries such as chemicals, garment and leather, and food processing. The relatively lower 
innovation efforts might explain why most Chinese firms in low-tech industries have not been able to catch 
up with technological advances, as argued by Fu and Gong (2010).  
Insert table 4 here 
The lack of efficiency of Chinese SOEs is also shown in the innovation input and output data. The 
proportion of firms that do in-house R&D is higher for SOEs than for the total sample, and the same goes 
for technology purchasing. As a result, the innovation propensities in terms of products and processes are 
above the overall averages. However, the intensities of R&D and TP expenditures per employee are lower 
for SOEs than for the overall sample; and the average value of new product sales per employee, which takes 
into account the relative level and the market success of innovation, is substantially below the overall sample 
average. A similar pattern holds in terms of firm size. Enterprises with fewer than 100 employees are lower 
in terms of engaging in R&D and TP and introducing new products and processes, but higher in terms of 																																																								15	The percentage of firms that claimed to have positive expenditures of R&D and TP in the period under review. 	
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R&D, TP, and product-innovation intensities compared with other two groups (firms with 100 to 300 
employees and firms with more than 300 employees).  
 
5. Empirical results 
We now turn to the results of the econometric analysis regarding how the two technology-sourcing 
strategies, R&D and TP, affect the innovation and productivity performances of small and medium-sized 
Chinese manufacturing firms, and the question of whether they are substitutes or complements. We have 
divided the sample into three groups: the set of firms with fewer than 100 employees (very small-sized 
firms), the set of those with more than 100 and fewer than 300 employees (small-sized firms), and the set of 
those with more than 300 employees (medium-sized firms), because there are some clear differences 
between the three groups.  
5.1 The role of R&D and TP in stimulating innovation 
Table 5 presents the marginal effects of the regressors in the Probit model (equation 3.1) and the tobit type 
II model (equations (3.2) and (3.3)). The observed frequencies of R&D performers and technology 
purchasers are 42 per cent and 18 per cent respectively, and only six firms which bought knowledge from 
outside did not perform their own R&D. We had difficulties identifying a separate intercept for firms with 
their own R&D and external technology purchases and therefore did not introduce the interaction of the 
two dummies in the model.  
Insert table 5 here 
In Table 5 we report the marginal effects of the explanatory variables for the probit regression for process 
innovation and the selection equation for product innovation and the marginal effects on the unconditional 
expected value of new product sales per employee. In Appendix A we derive the marginal effects of the 
regressors on the conditional (equation 7) and unconditional expectations of new product sales per 
employee (equations (10)–(14)). When computing the marginal effects of dummy Ib or Im, we take into 
account all the terms where these two dummies appear (i.e. four terms in total). For Imln(R&D/labour) and 
Ibln(TP/labour), we include in the computation of the elasticities of square term and the interaction term. 
The marginal effects of Imln(R&D/labour)2/2 and Ibln(TP/labour)2/2 represent second-order derivatives, 
and the marginal effect of Imln(R&D/labour)*Ibln(TP/labour) represents the second-order cross derivative 
of the unconditional expectation of new product sales/employee. Standard errors are computed using the 
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Delta method.16 
R&D is found to have a significant positive effect on process innovation only for firms with more than 300 
employees. Firms that do R&D have a 21.3 percentage-point higher incidence of process innovation than 
those that do no R&D (coefficient of Im).17 Our data do not allow us to conclude anything regarding the 
marginal effect of a quantitative increase in R&D on process innovation, except for small firms where a 10 
per cent increase in R&D per employee increases the probability of innovating by 0.7 percentage points. 
Technology purchasing has a negative and significant effect on process innovation, again only in a certain 
sized class, this time medium-sized firms: technology-purchasing firms have there on average a 15.8 
percentage-point lower incidence of process innovation than non-technology-purchasing firms. For all other 
firms we cannot conclude anything about how TP affects process innovation. Our two sources of 
technology have a clearer effect on product innovation. In very small firms (fewer than 100 employees), 
R&D performing firms have a 22.5 percentage-point higher probability of being product innovators and 
43.9 per cent higher sales of new products per employee than non-R&D-performing firms. In medium-sized 
firms the incidence is 35.7 percentage points higher, and the sales of new products per employee are 54 per 
cent higher for R&D firms than for non-R&D firms. In small firms (between 100 and 300 employees), these 
magnitudes are not precisely estimated, but the new-product sales elasticity with respect to R&D is 0.404. 
Technology purchasing has also a positive effect on product innovation. In very small firms, TP firms have 
on average a 26.6 per cent higher sales figure per employee than non-TP firms; small TP firms are on 
average 32.4 percentage points more likely to innovate in products than are non-TP firms; and their sales per 
employee are 86.1 per cent higher – a figure which, however, declines by 2.1 per cent as TP expenditure per 
employee increases by 10 per cent (coefficient of Ib ln(TP/labour));18 and finally in medium-sized firms new 
product sales per employee rise by 3.8 per cent as TP per employee increases by 10 per cent. The only 
significant sign of complementarity between R&D and TP is visible for small firms, where the elasticity of 
new product sales per employee with respect to R&D increases by 0.22 per cent as technology purchasing 
increases by 10 per cent.19 The synergy between own R&D and external technology purchasing, at least as it 
is evident in small Chinese manufacturing firms (between 100 and 300 employees), is in line with the 
argument of absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) and the results reported by Li and Wu (2010), 
Liu and White (1997), Liu and Buck (2007), and Liu and Zou (2008). 
Among the control variables, characteristics such as being an exporter, a young firm, a foreign-owned firm, 																																																								16	The Delta method is based on the first order approximation around the mean. For more details, see Oehlert (1992).	17	When computing the marginal effects of Ib or Im, we take into account all the terms where these two dummies appear (i.e. four 
terms in total). 	18 	When computing the marginal effects of Imln(R&D/labour) and Ibln(TP/labour), the elasticities of the square term 
(Imln(R&D/labour)2/2 and Ibln(TP/labour)2/2) and the interaction term (Imln(R&D/labour)*Ibln(TP/labour)) are also accounted. 	19	As Ai and Norton (2003) pointed out, complementarity should be based on a positive sign of the cross-elasticity and not the 
interaction term alone.	
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or a firm that co-operates in R&D positively affect the probability or the intensity of innovating. Exporting 
firms with 100 to 300 and more than 300 employees have a 16 and 14 percentage-point higher probability of 
process innovation. Old firms are expected to be less dynamic and innovative (Katrak, 1997). Indeed, they 
have 1.2 to 2.7 percentage-point lower sales of new products per employee in very small and small-sized 
firms. Foreign-owned firms with fewer than 100 employees have a 30 percentage-point higher product-
innovation intensity. Due to the high costs and uncertainties connected with innovation, firms with profits 
are more likely to have the adequate financial resources to innovate. An increase of 1,000 RMB in profit per 
employee increases by 0.3 percentage points the sales of new products per employee for firms with fewer 
than 100 employees and by 1.7 and 1.8 percentage points for small and medium-sized firms. State-owned 
enterprises have a 21 percentage-point higher probability of innovating in processes if they have more than 
300 employees. They probably benefit from greater financial and policy support from government. R&D 
collaborations with other firms, public research institutes, and universities increase the probability of 
innovation and the intensity of product innovations especially for the very small firms (see Boeing, Mueller, 
and Sandner, 2012). Those with fewer than 100 employees that benefit from any kind of R&D collaboration 
have 60 percentage-point higher sales of new products per employee. For firms with 100 to 300 employees, 
it is mostly collaborations with other firms and universities that affect the innovation intensity, increasing it 
by 59.6 and 53.5 percentage points. Collaborations with universities seem to decrease sales of new products 
per employee by 36.3 per cent in medium-sized firms.  
5.2 The role of R&D and TP in promoting productivity 
We now go a step further and examine the issue of complementarity or substitutability between in-house 
R&D and technology purchasing in terms of achieving a better productivity performance, since in the end 
innovation serves to improve productivity. Table 6 presents the results of the productivity equation (5) 
obtained using ordinary least squares (OLS) and the system GMM method. The system GMM exploits the 
orthogonality conditions between the first differences in the error term and the explanatory variables in 
levels lagged by one period, once for 2002 and once for 2001, and the orthogonality conditions between the 
error terms in levels and the lagged first differences of the explanatory variables. Hence in total there are 85 
orthogonality conditions, 29 estimated coefficients, and consequently 56 overidentifying restrictions.20 The 																																																								20	The number of orthogonality conditions equals the number of instruments used for the endogenous variables plus the number of 
pre-determined variables (used as their own instruments). In the GMM case, 14 variables are considered to be endogenous (the first 
14 independent variables in the table). We consider the first differences in the error term of the productivity equation to be 
orthogonal to the one- and two-period lagged levels of the endogenous variables for the year 2002 and to the one-period lagged 
levels of the endogenous variables for the year 2001 (remember, we have no data prior to 2000). That makes 42 orthogonality 
conditions so far. As to the level of the error term, we consider it to be orthogonal to the first differences in the endogenous 
variables for 2002 and for 2001. That makes 28 additional orthogonality conditions (14 for each year). So, in total the system GMM 
exploits 70 orthogonality conditions to instrument for the endogenous variables, plus 15 orthogonality conditions using the 
predetermined variables of our model (the time, industry, ownership and exporting status dummies) in the first difference equations, 
which makes a grand total of 85 orthogonality conditions. The number 56 in the Hansen overidentification test equals the total 
number of orthogonality conditions (85) minus the number of estimated parameters (29).	
	 17	
OLS estimates are likely to be inconsistent, because of the endogeneity of the conventional inputs and the 
innovation-strategy variables. They are only shown as a benchmark. In the presence of a positive 
productivity shock, we expect firms to increase their inputs, but the existence of adjustment costs for labour 
and capital will have them increase materials more than the two quasi-fixed inputs. Hence we would expect 
an upward bias in the estimate of the output elasticity of the inputs, more for materials than for labour and 
capital. R&D is probably more quasi-fixed than technology purchases, and hence we expect a stronger 
upward bias for the latter than for the former. The directions of bias are partly confirmed by our estimates. 
Yet the OLS estimates are not very different from the GMM estimates, which is a sign that the latter are not 
unreasonable. Our interpretation will be based on the system GMM estimation, which tackles the 
endogeneity problem. The instruments used in the GMM estimation are acceptable by the Hansen test of 
overidentifying restrictions, which is only significantly different from zero at a p-value of 38 (resp. 16) per 
cent for firms with fewer (resp. more) than 100 employees. The Difference-in-Hansen test also accepts the 
28 additional orthogonality conditions of the level equations that differentiate the System GMM from the 
First-difference GMM estimates.21 
Insert table 6 here 
We have chosen a translog approximation to a general production function in the conventional inputs (the 
h(.) function in equation (4)) as well as a translog approximation of the total factor productivity expression in 
the two technology variables (the g(.) function in equation (4)). We have normalized the conventional inputs, 
capital and material, and the technology inputs, R&D and TP, by labour and introduced a separate labour 
term to capture the departure from constant returns to scale with respect to all the inputs.22 The point of 
approximation is around unit values of the input/output ratios, which is out of the sample for the 
conventional inputs (see Table 2) but quite reasonable for the technology inputs (see Table 4). We have also 
accounted for the fact that many firms have no R&D or no technology purchase by including dummy 
indicators for these two variables and by interacting these dummy variables with their respective amounts 
when they are positive.  
We cannot reject the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale (the ln(labour) coefficient is not 
significantly different from 0). Capital and material are substitutes. We report the output elasticities of 
physical capital, materials, R&D, and TP evaluated at the means of the variables.23 The elasticities for capital 																																																								
21 The two-step system GMM performed in STATA 11, using the xtabond2 command, automatically corrects the standard errors for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Roodman, 2006). 	
22 By dividing all the inputs by labour and dividing output by labour, we have imposed that the second-order parameters of the 
translog approximation sum up to zero and the first-order terms sum up to 1, so as to impose constant returns to scale. We have 
then allowed the sum of the first-order terms to deviate from 1 by allowing for a labour first-order term to appear on the right-hand 
side.	23	When the marginal effects were computed, we include the elasticities of the square term and the interaction term. See footnotes 
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are quite reasonable, around .08 to .18 for capital and .53 to .62 for material. 
The results in Table 6 show that firms with in-house R&D/employee at its mean value and no TP have a 29 
(resp. 18 per cent) higher labour productivity than firms with no R&D in the small (resp. medium-sized 
firms) and no significant difference in labour productivity for very small firms (coefficients of Im). In 
contrast, the effect of technology purchases is visible mainly in very small firms and small firms, but not in 
medium-sized firms. With technology purchases are at their mean value and no R&D, very small (resp. 
small) firms have a 69 (resp. 39) per cent higher labour productivity than firms with no technology 
purchasing. Medium-sized firms show no significant difference in labour productivity between TP and non-
TP firms. For firms that do both R&D and TP, labour productivity is significantly lower than for firms that 
do neither of them. In this sense, the two means of knowledge accumulation are at odds with each other. 
Since their respective effect on innovation (product and process) is generally positive, the average negative 
effect on labour productivity for firms that pursue both strategies must be due to some excessive cost, a 
possible duplication of knowledge acquisition, or some correlation of those activities with other associated 
characteristics, such as lack of experience or age of the firm. For instance, one could imagine that young, 
non-technology-based firms, are less efficient because they lack know-how or technological capabilities, 
which they try to acquire by all possible means from inside or outside the firm.  
The elasticity of output with respect to R&D (for R&D-performing firms) shows significance only for small 
firms, where we obtain an elasticity of 0.11, which is quite consistent with the elasticities reported in the 
literature (see Hall, Mairesse, Mohnen, 2010). The elasticity of output with respect to TP (for firms with TP) 
is significant at 0.10 (coefficient of Ib ln(TP/labour)) in medium-sized firms and not significant elsewhere. A 
complementarity between R&D and TP actually shows up in very small firms (coefficient of Ibm 
ln(R&D/labour)ln(TP/labour)), while in the other firms the cross-elasticity of output with respect to R&D 
and TP is not significant. This means that in very small firms the returns from investing in one source of 
knowledge, R&D or technology purchasing, increase with the investment in the other source. In that sense 
the two strategies are complements. As for the control variables, the results are not surprising. In China, the 
majority of foreign-invested firms are in the high-tech industry and in general characterized by the higher 
average technical efficiency compared with domestic firms (Fu and Gong, 2010). As expected, foreign-
owned firms are more productive than the reference category of firms in terms of ownership structure, i.e. 
domestic, non-state-owned firms. In contrast to foreign firms, SOEs tend to be less productive compared 
with firms with other ownership structures. This evidence reflects the inefficiency of Chinese SOEs. This 
finding is consistent with studies in other developing countries (Braga and Willmore, 1991). Exporting firms 
in China, at least those with more than 300 employees, are more productive than non-exporting firms. This 																																																																																																																																																																																
17 and 18. For computing the marginal effects of ln(capital/labour) and ln(material/labour), the square term and the interaction 
term are also included. 	
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may indicate that the pressure on international markets enables firms to foster their productivity, or that the 
higher productivity enables firms to export.  
We must be cautious when we compare our results with others in the literature. Hu et al. (2005) found 
complementarity between domestic R&D and technology transfer. But their results are based on large and 
medium-sized Chinese enterprises which probably involve a different pattern of innovation-sourcing 
strategies. Bönte (2003) and Belderbos et al. (2008) showed complementarity between internal (i.e. in-house) 
and external (i.e. contracted-out) R&D in West Germany and the Netherlands respectively. But our study is 
not comparable to theirs, because our measure of purchased technology relates to the purchase of existing 
technology, from domestic or foreign sources, and not to the execution of R&D outside of the firm’s R&D 
facilities. We investigate the complementarity not between between ways of performing R&D but between 
R&D and the purchase of existing technology. Fikkert (1993) and Basant and Fikkert (1996) found 
substitutability between R&D and TP for Indian firms, but that was in a regime where there were controls 
on the external sourcing of technology, whereas in the period that we are examining Chinese firms were 
actually encouraged to import technology.24 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper explores the impact of internal and external technology sourcing on firms’ innovation and 
productivity performance in Chinese small- and medium-sized manufacturing firms. In particular, it 
investigates the returns of R&D and external technology purchasing (TP) and their possible 
complementarity or substitutability. It does so by distinguishing two performance measures: innovation in 
products or processes and labour productivity. Since size may matter in this regard, we estimate separately 
the relationships for firms with fewer than 100, between 100 and 300, and more than 300 employees.  
Do Chinese firms need both R&D and TP in order to grow and catch up with technological advances? Our 
evidence suggests (1) that firms with R&D are more innovative; (2) that firms with TP are (with the 
exception of process innovations in medium-sized firms) more innovative than non-TP firms; (3) that the 
elasticities or semi-elasticities of process or product innovation with respect to R&D and TP are positive 
whenever they are significant (with the exception of TP on product-innovation intensity in small firms); (4) 
that the output elasticities of R&D and TP are always positive whenever they are significant, and of a 
reasonable order of magnitude (around 0.10); and (5) that, whenever there are significant estimates, a 
complementarity exists between R&D and TP in promoting innovation or labour productivity.  
External technology purchasing complements internal R&D in fostering innovation and labour productivity. 
To the extent that firms might not be sufficiently informed of this synergy in technology acquisition, it 																																																								24	We thank an anonymous referee for this remark.	
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might be useful for the Chinese government to promote the adoption of both sources of technology 
acquisition. The somewhat surprising result is that firms that do both do not necessarily have the highest 
productivity performance. The exact reasons for this phenomenon, which could be duplication in 
knowledge acquisition, short-term adjustment costs, or other characteristics of those particular firms, would 
be worth exploring further.  
Appendix A   Calculating the marginal effects of explanatory variables on the unconditional expectation of 
new products sales per employee 
The conditional expected value of 𝑦! is: E y! y!* > 0 = β!' X! + E ε! ε! > -β!' X! = β!' X! + ϱσ! ! !!' !!! !!' !!  E y! y! = 1 = β!! X! + E ε! ε! > −β!! X! = β!! X! + ϱσ! ! !!!!!! !!!!!          (1) 
Using the inverse Mills Ratio 𝜆 a = ! !!!! ! = ! !!! !! = ! !!!!!! !!!!!      (2) 
where 𝑎 = !!!!!!!!(!!)!! = −𝛽!!𝑋!  𝜙 and Φ are, respectively, the normal density function and the normal distribution function, 𝑦! represents 
new product sales per employee (innosalei), Xi are the regressors of equation i where i=1,2 (index 1 refers to 
the selection equation (3.3) and index 2 to the intensity equation (3.2)), we can rewrite the conditional 
expected value of 𝑦! is: E y! y!∗ > 1 = β!! X! + E ε! ε! > −β!! X! = β!! X! + ϱσ!λ 𝑎      (3) 
The conditional marginal effects: !! !! !!∗!!!!! = β!" + ϱσ! !!! ! !!!! ! ! !!!! = β!" − ϱσ!β!" !! ! !!! ! ! ! ! ![!!! ! ]!    (4) 𝜙! 𝑎 = − 𝑎 ∗ 𝜙 𝑎           (5) 𝜆 𝑎 ! = −𝛽!!𝜆 𝑎 [𝜆 𝑎 − 𝑎]        (6) 𝜕𝐸 𝑦! 𝑦!∗ > 0𝜕𝑥! = 𝛽!! − 𝜚𝜎! 𝛽!! { 𝜙 𝑎 !1−Φ 𝑎 ! − 𝑎 ∗ 𝜙 𝑎 ∗ 1−Φ 𝑎1−Φ 𝑎 ! } 
     = 𝛽!! − 𝜚𝜎! 𝛽!! ! !!! !! ! !!! !! − 𝑎  
                            = 𝛽2𝑖 − 𝜚𝜎2𝛽1𝑖𝜆 𝑎 [𝜆 𝑎 − 𝑎]        (7) 
This is the marginal effect of 𝑥!  on the conditional expected value of 𝑦!. Here, we are considering only the 
effect of 𝑥!  on the value of 𝑦! for those having product innovation.	Notice that the conditional marginal 
effect in (7) depends on the vector X!, since a = −β!! X!. In general, the conditional marginal effect of a 
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variable x! will be different for each observation (individual). We shall evaluate it at the means of the 
observations for each variable. 
 
The unconditional expected value of new product sales per employee is given by: 
 𝐸(𝑦!|𝑋) = E 𝜀! 𝜀! > −𝛽!!𝑋! Φ(𝛽!!𝑋!)+ E 𝜀! 𝜀! < −𝛽!!𝑋! Φ(−𝛽!!𝑋!)    (8) 
 
Since y2 = 0 if a firm has no product innovation: 𝜀! < −𝛽!!𝑋!. Then (8) can be written as 
 𝐸(𝑦!) = E 𝜀! 𝜀! > −𝛽!!𝑋! Φ(𝛽!!𝑋!)         (9) 
 
The unconditional effect is: 
 !!(!!)!!! = Φ(β!! X!) !(!!|!!∗!!)!!! + β!"E ε! ε! > −β!! X! ϕ(β!! X!)   = Φ 𝛽!!𝑋! {𝛽!! − 𝜚𝜎!𝛽!!𝜆 𝑎 𝜆 𝑎 − 𝑎 }   + 𝛽!![𝛽!!𝑋! + 𝜚𝜎!𝜆 𝑎 ]ϕ(𝛽!!𝑋!)              (10) 
 
Following (10), the second-order derivative with respect to 𝑥!  is 𝜕!𝐸(𝑦!)𝜕𝑥!𝜕𝑥! =  ϕ 𝛽!!𝑋! ∗ 𝛽!! ∗ 𝛽!! − 𝜚𝜎!𝛽!!𝜆 𝑎 𝜆 𝑎 − 𝑎 −Φ 𝛽!!𝑋! ∗ 𝜚𝜎!𝛽!!𝑊 
 +𝛽!! [𝛽!!𝑋! + 𝜚𝜎!𝜆 𝑎 ∗ −𝛽!!𝑋! ∗ ϕ 𝛽!!𝑋! ∗ 𝛽!! + ϕ 𝛽!!𝑋! ∗ 𝑄}                (11) 
 
where 
 𝑊 = 𝜆 𝑎 ! − 𝜆 𝑎 ∗ 𝑎 ! = 2𝜆 𝑎 ∗ 𝜆 𝑎 ! − [𝜆 𝑎 ! ∗ 𝑎 + 𝑎! ∗ 𝜆 𝑎 ] 
     = 2𝜆 𝑎 ∗ 𝛽!!𝜆 𝑎 𝑎 − 𝜆 𝑎 − {𝛽!!𝜆 𝑎 [𝑎 − 𝜆 𝑎 ]  ∗ 𝑎 − 𝛽!!𝜆 𝑎 } 
     = 2𝛽!!𝜆 𝑎 ! 𝑎 − 𝜆 𝑎 − 𝛽!!𝜆 𝑎 {[𝑎 − 𝜆 𝑎 ]  ∗ 𝑎 − 1}                (12) Q = [𝛽!!𝑋! + 𝜚𝜎!𝜆 𝑎 ]! = 𝛽!! + 𝜚𝜎!𝛽!!𝜆 𝑎 𝑎 − 𝜆 𝑎 .                 (13) 
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Table 2 Firm averages across industries (full sample) 
 
 
Notes: Productivity is in logarithm of sales (in 1000 RMB) per employee.  
Capital and material are also logarithmically transformed and in 1000RMB/employee. 
Labour is the logarithm of the number of employees in the firm. 
R&D_UNI: dummy variable =1 if a firm reports co-operation with universities. 
R&D_PRI: dummy variable =1 if a firm reports co-operation with public research institutes. 
R&D_FIRM: dummy variable =1 if a firm reports co-operation with other firms.  
																																																								
26 t-tests have been used to test the differences in means between SOEs and non-SOEs for our main variables. The differences are 
significant (at 90 per cent level) for all variables in Table 2 except for R&D_UNI, R&D_RES and R&D_FIRM. Similar t-tests have 
been conducted to compare the means of main variables for different-sized classes. The differences are always significant (at 90 per 
cent level) for firms with fewer than 100 and those with between 100 and 300 employees. For firms with 100 to 300 and above 300 



















leather 778 3.871 3.091 3.059 4.953 0.090 0.193 0.391 12.772 0.042 0.035 0.063 
Electronic 
equipment 375 5.044 3.851 4.080 4.957 0.200 0.224 0.195 9.523 0.237 0.187 0.205 
Electronic parts 614 4.210 3.690 3.321 4.860 0.259 0.137 0.176 16.614 0.155 0.137 0.164 
Household 
electronics 128 4.525 3.825 3.273 5.216 0.047 0.367 0.445 11.461 0.172 0.102 0.188 
Auto & auto 
parts 734 4.344 3.716 3.560 5.261 0.228 0.113 0.108 16.634 0.082 0.105 0.178 
Food 
processing 144 4.483 3.624 3.603 4.898 0.250 0.146 0.069 15.708 0.188 0.181 0.125 
Chemical 
products 134 4.287 3.935 2.980 4.865 0.261 0.045 0.104 14.985 0.082 0.194 0.157 
Biotech 
products 60 4.764 4.106 2.986 4.901 0.200 0.050 0.067 11.400 0.417 0.417 0.133 
Metallurgical 
products 327 3.601 3.534 2.601 4.765 0.312 0.092 0.064 17.294 0.055 0.086 0.150 
Transportation 
equipment 38 3.100 2.565 1.887 4.216 0.237 0.079 0.000 11.816 0.000 0.000 0.132 
             
SOE firms26 671 3.845 4.066 2.901 5.666 1.000 0.000 0.107 28.261 0.142 0.137 0.168 
Non-SOEs  2661 4.313 3.439 3.402 4.808 0.000 0.171 0.225 11.079 0.107 0.107 0.139 
Employees  
< 100 1304 3.972 3.215 3.097 3.743 0.112 0.079 0.080 10.888 0.080 0.070 0.110 
Employees>=1
00 & <300	 1026 4.361 3.533 3.455 5.126 0.151 0.188 0.252 12.901 0.112 0.110 0.148 
Employees  
>= 300 1002 4.393 4.054 3.409 6.443 0.369 0.215 0.306 20.967 0.161 0.172 0.187 
Total 3332 4.219 3.565 3.301 4.981 0.201 0.153 0.201 14.539 0.114 0.113 0.145 
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Table 3 Firm averages across industries (for SOEs) 
 
 
Notes: Productivity is in logarithm of sales (in 1000 RMB) per employee.  
Capital and material are also in logarithmically transformed and in 1000RMB/employee. 
Labour is the logarithm of the number of employees in the firm. 
R&D_UNI: dummy variable =1 if a firm reports co-operation with universities. 
R&D_PRI: dummy variable =1 if a firm reports co-operation with public research institutes. 
R&D_FIRM: dummy variable =1 if a firm reports co-operation with other firms. 
 
  










leather 70 3.376 3.814 2.439 5.141 0.257 26.014 0.029 0.029 0.057 
Electronic 
equipment 75 4.513 3.833 3.578 5.456 0.120 18.600 0.280 0.267 0.240 
Electronic 
parts 159 3.808 4.094 2.823 5.520 0.164 28.843 0.189 0.214 0.257 
Household 
electronics 6 2.383 4.717 1.762 6.159 0.000 3.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Auto & auto 
parts 167 4.068 4.351 3.312 6.258 0.072 33.413 0.126 0.072 0.137 
Food 
processing 36 3.818 4.176 2.851 5.181 0.000 35.833 0.083 0.028 0.083 
Chemical 
products 35 3.964 4.168 2.911 5.541 0.114 24.971 0.029 0.057 0.228 
Biotech 
products 12 4.034 4.351 2.832 5.438 0.000 31.500 0.333 0.500 0.083 
Metallurgical 
products 102 3.459 3.758 2.413 5.684 0.029 27.676 0.127 0.147 0.117 
Transportation 
equipment 9 3.225 3.970 1.138 5.285 0.000 22.000 0.000 0.000 0.333 
           
Total 671 3.845 4.066 2.901 5.666 0.107 28.261 0.142 0.137 0.168 
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics of innovation inputs and outputs across industries (mean values in 2002) 
 
Industry 
Innovation New product 
sales per 
employee 














Garment & leather 0.246 0.123 2.344 0.264 -0.186 0.078 -0.180 0.074 0.256 
Electronic equipment 0.643 0.384 3.123 0.616 0.746 0.256 -0.001 0.240 0.749 
Electronic parts 0.542 0.316 2.116 0.485 0.196 0.223 0.000 0.214 0.362 
Household electronics 0.648 0.438 2.625 0.581 -0.031 0.256 -0.042 0.256 1.212 
Auto & auto parts 0.527 0.260 2.151 0.482 0.079 0.215 -0.167 0.215 0.655 
Food processing 0.553 0.261 2.420 0.396 -0.233 0.229 -0.210 0.229 0.341 
Chemical products 0.425 0.224 1.365 0.304 0.005 0.217 -0.089 0.217 0.245 
Biotech products 0.700 0.222 2.407 0.600 0.693 0.350 0.288 0.350 1.039 
Metallurgical products 0.385 0.220 1.530 0.312 -0.072 0.128 -0.199 0.119 0.443 
Transportation 
equipment 0.143 0.086 0.424 0.154 0.484 0.077 0.031 0.077 0.030 
    
	    
SOE firms27 0.563 0.328 1.294 0.485 -0.142 0.203 -0.247 0.194 0.440 
Non-SOEs 0.440 0.231 2.761 0.405 0.155 0.179 -0.071 0.175 0.502 
Employees < 100  0.353 0.194 2.970 0.278 0.143 0.106 0.005 0.101 0.229 
Employees>=100 & 
<300 0.476 0.242 2.852 0.411 0.103 0.192 -0.094 0.183 0.557 
Employees  
>= 300 0.608 0.331 1.635 0.614 0.024 0.275 -0.262 0.272 0.753 
Total 0.464 0.251 2.278 0.422 0.094 0.184 -0.107 0.178 0.489 
 
Note: Innovation (products/process): dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has introduced a new product (process) in 
the period of 2000 to 2002.  
New product sales: sales of new product per employee, in logarithms.  
R&D expenditure (RD) and technology purchases (TP) are expressed in 1000 RMB per employee, in logs;  
R&D&TP is the product of R&D and TP.  
The means for R&D, TP, and R&D*TP are only taken for positive values of R&D and/or TP. 
 
																																																								27	t-tests have been used to test the differences in means between SOEs and non-SOEs for our main variables. The differences are 
significant (at 90 per cent level) for all variables in Table 2 except for TP. Similar t-tests have been conducted to compare the means 
of main variables for different-sized classes. The differences are always significant (at 90 per cent level) for firms with 100 to 300 and 
above 300 employees. For firms with fewer than 100 and those between 100 and 300 employees, the only variable where the 
differences are not significant at 90 per cent level is PROCESS.	
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Table 5 Estimation results of innovation output (probit for process innovation, tobit type II for product 
innovation), marginal effects 
  <100 employees >=100 & <300 employees >=300 employees 



























 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Im     0.108 0.439*** 0.225*** -0.058 0.404** 0.138 0.213*** 0.540** 0.357*** 
 (0.068) (0.127) (0.083) (0.071) (0.177) (0.090) (0.067) (0.266) (0.079) 
Ib    -0.013 0.266* -0.047 0.028 0.861*** 0.324** -0.158** 0.200 -0.078 
 (0.088) (0.147) (0.125) (0.098) (0.198) (0.131) (0.072) (0.192) (0.108) 
Im ln(R&D/labour) 0.017 0.064 -0.016 0.072** 0.441*** 0.057 -0.013 0.031 0.020 
 (0.024) (0.042) (0.032) (0.036) (0.058) (0.036) (0.029) (0.069) (0.035) 
Imln(R&D/labour)2
/2 0.002 0.002 0.039 -0.021 0.056*** 0.023 -0.026 -0.002 -0.026 
 (0.019) (0.003) (0.026) (0.028) (0.013) (0.024) (0.021) (0.002) (0.025) 
Ib ln(TP/labour) 0.080 0.120 -0.036 -0.012 -0.214** 0.113 0.052 0.376*** -0.015 
 (0.057) (0.100) (0.067) (0.053) (0.105) (0.086) (0.049) (0.106) (0.067) 
Ib ln(TP/labour)2/2 0.032 0.004 0.017 -0.112 -0.004** -0.191* 0.019 0.036 -0.029 
 (0.055) (0.004) (0.079) (0.079) (0.001) (0.098) (0.030) (0.028) (0.041) 
Ibm ln(R&D/labour) -0.029 0.005 0.009 0.087 0.022** 0.098 0.011 -0.004 0.040 
    *ln(TP/labour) (0.056) (0.003) (0.053) (0.091) (0.012) (0.085) (0.042) (0.009) (0.026) 
SOE -0.057 0.090 0.105 0.076 0.065 0.087 0.210** -0.175 0.136 
  (0.056) (0.128) (0.094) (0.091) (0.198) (0.111) (0.083) (0.178) (0.083) 
FOREIGN 0.073 0.304** 0.083 0.005 -0.354** -0.075 0.091 0.298* -0.011 
  (0.089) (0.126) (0.106) (0.074) (0.157) (0.102) (0.079) (0.179) (0.088) 
AGE -0.002 -0.012*** -0.006** -0.000 -0.027*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) 
CAPITAL/labour 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
  (avg 2000-2002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
PROFIT/labour -0.001* 0.003*** 0.001 -0.001 0.017*** 0.004* 0.002** 0.018*** 0.011*** 
  (avg 2000-2002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
EXPORT 0.042 -0.152 -0.000 0.164* -0.072 0.091 0.142* -0.043 0.016 
 (0.084) (0.133) (0.102) (0.089) (0.161) (0.102) (0.076) (0.161) (0.084) 
R&D_UNI 0.203** 0.616*** 0.197* 0.114 0.535*** 0.120 0.069 -0.363** -0.001 
 (0.098) (0.124) (0.110) (0.092) (0.164) (0.113) (0.080) (0.175) (0.090) 
R&D_PRI -0.017 0.636*** 0.038 0.140 0.114 0.121 -0.013 0.135 -0.032 
   (0.073) (0.120) (0.109) (0.094) (0.156) (0.113) (0.079) (0.184) (0.099) 
R&D_FIRM 0.069 0.688*** 0.390*** 0.101 0.596*** 0.324*** 0.175** 0.151 0.264*** 
  (0.072) (0.112) (0.088) (0.078) (0.164) (0.091) (0.076) (0.181) (0.069) 
ρ   0.079   -0.695**   -0.803**  
          
ση   1.233   1.533   1.635  
            
Nb observations 435 159 435 338 176 338 342 210 342 
 
*** p–value 0.01, ** p–value 0.05, * p–value 0.1. Industry dummies are included. City dummies are included in the 
probit for process innovation and in the selection equation for the product innovation. New product sales per 
employee are in logarithms. Ib indicates that R&D>0, Im indicates that TP>0, Ibm indicates that both R&D and TP are 
positive.  
In columns (1), (4), and (7) we report the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the incidence of process 
innovations, and in columns (3), (6), and (9) the marginal effects on the incidence of product innovations. In columns 
(2), (5), and (8) we report the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the unconditional expectation of new 
product sales per employee. Calculations of unconditional marginal effects/elasticities are based on (10)–(14) in 
Appendix A. When computing the marginal effects of Ib  or Im , we take into account all the terms where these two 
dummies appear (i.e. four terms in total). For Imln(R&D/labour) and Ibln(TP/labour), we include in the computation 
of the elasticities the effects of the square term and the interaction term. The marginal effects of Imln(R&D/labour)2/2 
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and Ibln(TP/labour)2/2 represent second-order derivatives and the marginal effect of  
Imln(R&D/labour)*Ibln(TP/labour) represents the second-order cross derivative of the unconditional expectation of 
new product sales/employee.  Standard errors are computed using the Delta method.  
 
Table 6 Estimation results of the productivity equation 
 
  <100 employees >=100 & <300 employees >=300 employees 
  OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM 
ln(capital/labour) 0.084*** 0.182*** 0.131*** 0.082** 0.183*** 0.079** 
 (0.016) (0.049) (0.023) (0.038) (0.027) (0.032) 
[ln(capital/labour)]2/2 0.001 -0.010 -0.009 0.019 0.019 0.029 
 (0.011) (0.022) (0.027) (0.019) (0.031) (0.060) 
ln(labour) 0.042 0.026 0.059 -0.000 -0.037 0.128 
 (0.035) (0.073) (0.071) (0.093) (0.042) (0.104) 
ln(material/labour) 0.657*** 0.619*** 0.620*** 0. 627*** 0.521*** 0.527*** 
 (0.013) (0.025) (0.017) (0.040) (0.015) (0.041) 
[ln(material/labour)]2/2 0.130*** 0.105*** 0.075*** 0.107*** 0.121*** 0.050** 
 (0.009) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.019) 
ln(capital/labour) -0.070*** -0.029 -0.039*** 0.011 -0.041*** -0.017 
   *ln(material/labour) (0.008) (0.024) (0.015) (0.025) (0.014) (0.025) 
Im     0.112* 0.147 0.247*** 0.294*** 0.269*** 0.177* 
 (0.060) (0.092) (0.074) (0.101) (0.074) (0.089) 
Ib    0.222 0.692*** -0.157 0.387*** 0.269 0.476 
 (0.270) (0.261) (0.182) (0.117) (0.284) (0.796) 
Ibm   -0.197 -0.939*** -0.016 -0.498*** -0.692 -0.581*** 
  (0.283) (0.288) (0.316) (0.148) (0.658) (0.196) 
Im ln(R&D/labour) 0.013 0.051 0.037 0.110*** 0.037* 0.049 
 (0.024) (0.035) (0.026) (0.036) (0.021) (0.031) 
Imln(R&D/labour)2/2 0.024 -0.006 0.003 -0.008 -0.012 -0.005 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) 
Ib ln(TP/labour) 0.005 -0.080 0.069 0.004 0.057 0.100*** 
 (0.058) (0.054) (0.045) (0.050) (0.036) (0.032) 
Ib ln(TP/labour)2/2 0.015 -0.036 0.039 -0.016 0.011 0.031** 
 (0.063) (0.035) (0.045) (0.029) (0.021) (0.014) 
Ibm ln(R&D/labour) 0.014 0.073** 0.002 0.013 0.006 0.005 
     * ln(TP/labour)  (0.037) (0.029) (0.028) (0.021) (0.012) (0.009) 
SOE -0.080 -0.137 -0.228*** -0.072 -0.362*** -0.336*** 
  (0.058) (0.107) (0.069) (0.106) (0.049) (0.075) 
FOREIGN 0.221*** 0.286*** 0.221*** 0.215*** 0.132** 0.171** 
  (0.070) (0.088) (0.064) (0.067) (0.055) (0.069) 
EXPORT 0.019 0.007 0.111* 0.076 0.202*** 0.150** 
  (0.069) (0.081) (0.061) (0.062) (0.053) (0.062) 
Constant 1.602*** 1.576*** 1.542*** 1.152 2.278*** 0.628 
  (0.209) (0.395) (0.412) (0.906) (0.418) (0.967) 
        
R-squared 0.775 - 0.707 - 0.744 - 
Hansen overidentification test  chi2(56): 57.46  chi2(56): 56.34  chi2(56): 66.07 
Prob > chi2  0.384  0.462  0.091 
Difference-in-Hansen test  chi2(28): 32.02  chi2(28): 31.80  chi2(28): 24.10 
Prob > chi2  0.231  0.283  0.625 
Nb observations 1,304 1,304 1,026 1,026 1,002 1,002 
*** p–value 0.01, ** p–value 0.05, * p–value 0.1. Industry and year dummies are included. When computing the 
marginal effects of Ib  or Im we take into account all the terms where these two dummies appear (i.e. five terms in 
total). For Imln(R&D/labour) and Ibln(TP/labour), we include in the computation of the elasticities the effects of the 
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square term and the interaction term. The marginal effects of Imln(R&D/labour)2/2 and Ibln(TP/labour)2/2 represent 
second-order derivatives and the marginal effect of Imln(R&D/labour)*Ibln(TP/labour) represents the second-order 
cross derivative of the unconditional expectation of new product sales/employee. For the marginal effects of 
ln(capital/labour) and ln(material/labour), square term and the interaction term are also accounted.  Standard errors are 
computed using the Delta method. The marginal effects are evaluated at the means of the variables and only for 
positive values for R&D and TP. 
 
